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I. INTRODUCTION
The twenty-first amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion,1 adopted in 1933, repealed the eighteenth amendment2 and
gave states the power to regulate the delivery, possession, and use
of alcohol within their borders. The twenty-first amendment is an
1. The twenty-first amendment states in part: "The transportation or importation into
any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxi-
cating liquors, in violation of the law thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend.
XXI, § 2.
2. The eighteenth amendment states in part: "After one year from the ratification of
this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the im-
portation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory
subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST.
amend. XVIII, § 1.
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exception to the normal operation of the commerce clause, 3 which
restricts state regulation of activities affecting interstate
commerce.
The twenty-first amendment enhances the states' traditionally
broad police power to regulate alcohol.4 Although the federal
courts owe great deference to a state's exercise of its police power,5
the Supreme Court never has held that the twenty-first amend-
ment gives states the power to infringe on constitutionally pro-
tected individual rights while regulating alcohol. Recently, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has allowed state power under the
twenty-first amendment to impinge upon first amendment protec-
tion of commercial speech. This may be partly due to the uncertain
position of commercial speech in first amendment doctrine. The
Supreme Court only recently had extended first amendment cover-
age to commercial speech.' Although the Court has extended first
amendment protection to various forms of commercial advertising,
3. Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964); State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62-64 (1936). But see California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 106-10 (1980) (public policy in favor of compe-
tition in Sherman Antitrust Act requires commerce clause protection despite twenty-first
amendment); United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 299 (1945) (sus-
taining a federal antitrust prosecution of liquor price fixing).
The commerce clause states: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8. In 200 years of litigation the Court has waffled over the scope of the
commerce clause. The Court has used the commerce clause as both a source of federal power
to regulate commerce and a restraint on state regulations that interfere with interstate com-
merce. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976). The Court also has sustained the use of commerce power to effect the
purposes of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). For a discussion of the scope
of the commerce clause, see L. TamE, AMERIcAN CONsTrruToNAL LAW §§ 6-1 to -27 (1978).
4. See Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304 (1917). In Crane the Court stated:
It must now be regarded as settled that, on account of their well-known noxious quali-
ties and the extraordinary evils shown by experience commonly to be consequent upon
their use, a State has power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, gift, purchase, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within its borders without violating the guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 307; accord California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (states have general police
power to regulate alcoholic beverages even in the absence of the twenty-first amendment).
5. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 116.
6. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (unsolicited contracep-
tive advertisements); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980) (leaflets promoting energy use); Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)
(real estate for sale signs); Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (informational pamphlets on contraceptives).
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such as print media,7 billboards," and mail,9 the Court has not yet
fully defined the parameters of this new doctrine.10
This Recent Development examines the tension between the
first and twenty-first amendments when a state uses its twenty-
first amendment power to regulate advertisements of alcoholic bev-
erages that qualify for first amendment protection. Part II of this
Recent Development explores the Court's standard of review in
cases in which the twenty-first amendment impinges upon a four-
teenth amendment right. Part II also reviews the scope of constitu-
tional protection that the first amendment accords commercial
speech. Part III examines three recent cases in which states have
regulated alcohol advertising. Part IV criticizes these decisions for
misapplying the appropriate standard and for relying extensively
on distinguishable cases and state power under the twenty-first
amendment. Part V proposes an analytical framework for cases in-
volving tension between the first and twenty-first amendments and
then applies the framework to the recent decisions.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Bill of Rights and the Twenty-First Amendment
Although the Court often has upheld state regulation of alco-
hol against commerce clause challenges,1 the Court has deduced
that the twenty-first amendment does not limit the constitutional
protections that the Bill of Rights guarantees individuals. 2 Thus,
7. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (newspaper editor).
8. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (on-site commercial
advertisements).
9. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (leaf-
lets in mailed billings).
The Court also has extended first amendment protection to different kinds of commer-
cial advertising. See, e.g., Bates v. Arizona State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (private attorneys
advertising prices); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (advertising of non-
prescription contraceptives).
10. See Central Hudson 447 U.S. at 561-66.
11. See, e.g., Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964); State Bd. of
Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62-64 (1936).
12. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976). According to the Court: "Neither the
text nor the history of the Twenty-First Amendment suggests that it qualifies individual
rights protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment where the sale or use
of liquor is concerned." Id. (quoting P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTrrUTONAL DECISIONMAK-
ING, CASES AND MATERIALS 258 (1975)). The Court has held that many guarantees under the
Bill of Rights apply to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (plurality opinion) (Bill of Rights applies
equally to the states through the fourteenth amendment); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
707 (1931) (freedom of the press applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment);
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when a party alleges that a state statute regulating the use of alco-
hol violates the Bill of Rights, the statute does not qualify for a
more deferential standard of review merely because Congress
passed the twenty-first amendment. 3
In Wisconsin v. Constantineaul4 the Court rejected the argu-
ment that the twenty-first amendment permits a state to regulate
alcohol consumption at the expense of procedural due process."
The challenged statute authorized local law enforcement officials
to post the names of individuals who were irresponsible drinkers
Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927) (freedom of speech); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3,
§ 11-2.
13. The Supreme Court has developed two principal levels of review that it applies to
constitutional challenges to state regulations. The Court first suggested the two-tiered ap-
proach to equal protection in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938) (plurality opinion). The Court applies strict scrutiny analysis only if it finds a suspect
classification or the infringement of a fundamental interest. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S.
289 (1975) (voting is a fundamental interest); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race is a
suspect classification); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (classification
can stand only if it is "necessary to promote a compelling state interest") (quoting Kramer
v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)).
Traditionally, the Court requires that the state demonstrate only a rational basis for its
regulation. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (educa-
tion); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (decent shelter). For a discussion of the history
and current status of the rational basis test, see Bennett, "Mere" Rationality in Constitu-
tional Law: Judicial Review and Democratic Theory, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1049 (1979).
During the Lochner era the Court applied "strict scrutiny" in substantive due process
cases that concerned economic regulations. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). The demise of the Lochner approach brought rational review to economic due pro-
cess decisions. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). In substantive due pro-
cess cases the Court has revived the Lochner approach by applying strict scrutiny when a
fundamental interest is at stake. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abor-
tion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate). The Court, however, has not revitalized strict scru-
tiny of economic regulation, see G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
570-73, 584-91, 601 (10th ed. 1980), although occasionally it has used a more exacting ra-
tional basis test, see infra note 74. For further discussion of strict scrutiny and rational
basis analysis, see Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-24 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Gunther, Evolving Doctrine]; McCoy, Recent Equal Protection Decisions-Fundamental
Right to Travel or "Newcomers" as a Suspect Class?, 28 VAND. L. REV. 987, 988-95 (1975).
14. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
15. Id. at 437. Arguably no right to procedural due process could command as much
constitutional protection as one of the guarantees specifically enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 11-3. For a discussion of the Court's use of procedural
due process, see Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28 (1976); Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New
Property", Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445
(1977).
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and to prohibit people from selling or giving alcohol to anyone
whose name was on the list. 6 Although the state's police power
was at its peak, 17 the Court held that the ordinance was unconsti-
tutional because it failed to provide adequate procedural safe-
guards to protect an individual's right to reputation, honor, and
integrity.18
In Craig v. Boren 9 the Court reaffirmed Constantineau by
holding that the twenty-first amendment does not alter the appro-
priate standard for reviewing a state alcohol statute when a party
challenges the statute on equal protection grounds. 0 The Craig
Court invalidated a law that permitted women to purchase alcohol
at age eighteen, but prohibited men from purchasing alcohol until
age twenty-one.2' The Court reasoned that the twenty-first amend-
ment enhances the states' traditional police power to regulate alco-
hol directly, but determined that the amendment does not apply in
equal protection cases. 22 Using the intermediate standard of re-
view, which is appropriate in gender-based equal protection chal-
lenges,23 the Court concluded that the empirical findings in the
16. Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 434 n.2.
17. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. Simon, 596 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated and remanded
sub nom., 446 U.S. 949, panel opinion reinstated, 626 F.2d 1200 (5th Cir. 1980)), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
18. See Constantineau, 400 U.S. at 437. The Court emphasized:
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essen-
tial. "Posting" under the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to
others it is a stigma, an official branding of a person. The label is a degrading one.
Under the Wisconsin Act, a resident of Hartford is given no process at all. This appel-
lee was not afforded a chance to defend herself. She may have been the victim of an
official's caprice. Only when the whole proceedings leading to the pinning of an unsa-
vory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be prevented.
Id. But see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (right to reputation alone, without some
more tangible interest such as employment, does not implicate liberty or property interests
"sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause").
19. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
20. Id. at 209.
21. Id. at 210.
22. Id. at 206-09.
23. Id. at 197-98; see also Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-77 (1971) (implicit application
of intermediate level scrutiny). The Court applies intermediate level review when it finds
that a classification is not suspect, but deserves a higher level of protection than rational
review. See Note, Refining the Methods of Middle-Tier Scrutiny: A New Proposal for
Equal Protection, 61 Tax. L. REV. 1501 (1983). Even Justices who do not endorse the crea-
tion of an intermediate standard have acknowledged that the Court examines certain cases
with more than ordinary deferential review, but with less than strict scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 781-82 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
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record were not sufficient to sustain the state's unequal treatment
of men and women.24
Even though the Supreme Court has continued to observe the
principle that state power under the twenty-first amendment does
not alter the standard of review when a state infringes upon a con-
stitutionally protected individual right,25 the Court has appeared
to make an exception to this rule for some violations of the first
amendment.26 In California v. LaRue17 the Court sustained a state
regulation prohibiting certain kinds of grossly sexual entertain-
ment in establishments that have liquor licenses.28 The Court held
that while some of the prohibited activity fell under the protection
of the first amendment, the twenty-first amendment permits an in-
cidental infringement on protected speech when alternative forums
for the expression are available.29
Although a majority of the Court never explicitly endorsed intermediate level scrutiny,
the Court has applied this heightened standard in a variety of cases. See, e.g., Foley v.
Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (alienage); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975)
(gender-based classification); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (nonsanctioned
illegitimate children as a classification); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972) (unacknowledged illegitimate birth); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (illegiti-
mate birth); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote). As with
the other standards of review, the Court uses certain language to characterize intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197-98; see also G. GUNTHER, supra note 13,
at 674. The language that the Court uses when applying intermediate review is sufficiently
consistent to permit the inference of intermediate review even if the Court does not articu-
late the standard that it applies.
For further discussion of intermediate review, see L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 16-25 to
-32; Note, supra.
24. Craig, 429 U.S. at 201-04.
25. In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), the Court invalidated a stat-
ute that vested churches with the authority to veto applications for liquor licenses within a
500 foot radius of a church or school. Id. at 117. The Court based its holding on the estab-
lishment clause, but in a footnote indicated: "The State may not exercise its power under
the Twenty-First Amendment in a way which impinges upon the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment." Id. at 122 n.5; see also White v. Fleming, 522 F.2d 730, 733 (7th Cir.
1975); Women's Liberation Union v. Israel, 512 F.2d 106, 108 (1st Cir. 1975).
26. See Kamenshine, California v. LaRue: The Twenty-First Amendment as a Pre-
ferred Power, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1035 (1973); Note, Mississippi's Prohibition of Alcoholic
Beverage Advertising: A Constitutional Analysis, 5 COMM./ENT. L.J. 127 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Mississippi's Prohibition]; Note, Liquor Advertising: Resolving the Clash
Between the First and Twenty-First Amendments, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Liquor Advertising]; Note, The Constitutionality of Oklahoma's Prohibi-
tion on Liquor Advertising, 16 TULSA L.J. 734 (1981); Comment, Regulating Nude Dancing
in Liquor Establishments-The Preferred Position of the Twenty-First Amendment-Nail
v. Baca, 12 N.M.L. REV. 611 (1982).
27. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 118.
1426
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Even though the state clearly infringed upon LaRue's first
amendment rights, the Court did not reach a first amendment
analysis.3 Moreover, the majority substituted rational basis review
for the strict scrutiny test, which a first amendment infringement
usually warrants. 31 The Court justified this deferential analytical
posture by asserting that the challenged law regulated liquor, not
speech.3 2 Thus, the Court gave the state maximum leeway to regu-
late liquor directly, while reducing first amendment protection of
an indirect infringement on protected speech.33 One peculiar as-
pect of the Court's deferential rational review, however, was its re-
liance on empirical findings that substantiated the state's concern
over the effects of the mixture of alcohol and suggestive sexual ac-
tivity.3 4 Normally, rational review does not require empirical
support.3
In New York v. Bellanca36 the Supreme Court limited the ex-
tent to which the lower courts could confine LaRue to its facts. 7 In
30. Id.
31. See L. TRINE, supra note 3, § 11-1, at 565; id. § 12-2, at 581; Emerson, First
Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422, 432-40 (1980) (discuss-
ing whether the first amendment provides absolute or balanced protection); Van Alstyne, A
Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 107, 116, 118-19 (1982); see
also Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 701 F.2d 314, 326
(5th Cir.), vacated en bane sub nom. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 744-45 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984).
32. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 114.
33. See also United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding federal ban on
destruction of draft registration cards because the substantial governmental purpose was
not to suppress speech but to prohibit certain conduct); L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 12-6 to -
7.
Occasionally, the Court makes a distinction between first amendment protection of
speech and conduct. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (a demonstration on
the premises of a county jail is unprotected conduct); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965)
(upholding a statute preventing picketing near a courthouse as a valid regulation of conduct
not "pure speech"); International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957)
(permitting a state law banning peaceful labor picketing for illegal purposes because it was
"speech plus"). Professor Tribe points out that in one sense almost all speech is conduct. L.
TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-7, at 599. He argues that the distinction between speech and
conduct is without merit and that the cases are irreconcilable. Id. at 599-600. Professor
Tribe acknowledges, however, that the distinction likely will persist in first amendment ju-
risprudence. Id. at 601.
34. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 110-11 (state produced evidence of crime to support its
regulation).
35. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 427 (1961) (sustaining a state Sun-
day closing law against an equal protection challenge without empirical evidence); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (legislative findings not necessary to
sustain economic regulation under rational review).
36. 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam).
37. Despite LaRue's implications on the extent of an individual's first amendment
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Bellanca the Court upheld a state statute that prohibited topless
dancing in any establishment with a liquor license. The Court ap-
plied the rational basis test again,38 but implied that empirical
findings were not necessary to justify the state's interest, even
when the state incidentally infringed upon an individual's first
amendment right to free speech.3 9 The Court followed LaRue in
emphasizing that the statute regulated liquor, not speech.40
The Bellanca Court expanded the states' police power under
the twenty-first amendment beyond the parameters that the Court
established in LaRue.41 In Bellanca the state did not have to jus-
tify its interest by producing empirical evidence or proof of
"grossly sexual" behavior for the Court to uphold an incidental in-
fringement on a first amendment right.42 Thus, without even
resorting to a first amendment analysis, the Court held that the
states have sufficient police power under the twenty-first amend-
ment to override first amendment interests when the challenged
statute regulates sexually provocative entertainment in a facility
that has a liquor license.43
rights when a state exercises its twenty-first amendment police power, lower courts could
have limited the holding to the facts in the case. The entertainment in LaRue included
sexual activity, which the Court recognized as dangerous when viewed under the influence of
alcohol. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 111. The entertainment included nude dancing, oral copulation,
and public masturbation. Id. Technically, however, any activity that qualifies for constitu-
tional protection qualifies for full constitutional protection. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford,
718 F.2d 738 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984). But see Van Alstyne, supra note
31, at 140 (arguing that no technical interpretation of the first amendment presents an ade-
quate explanation of the kinds of analysis the Supreme Court undertakes in first amend-
ment cases).
38. The Court followed the standards that it established in LaRue. Bellanca, 452 U.S.
at 717-18.
39. The Court took judicial notice of the harms associated with nudity and alcohol by
quoting an excerpt from the legislative memorandum accompanying the statute. The memo-
randum justified the statute from a "common sense" standpoint. Id. The Court asserted
that the memorandum constituted legislative findings, but implied that even common sense
support was not necessary to justify the state's interest. Id. at 714.
40. Id. at 715-16.
41. See id. at 718 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens sharply criticized the ma-
jority opinion, not because of its result, but because of the "mischievous suggestion that the
Twenty-First Amendment gives states power to censor free expression in places where li-
quor is served." Id. at 723 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 714. But cf. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 110-11 (state produced evidence of crime to
support its regulation).
43. Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 718.
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B. First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech
First amendment protection of commercial speech is a recent
development in Supreme Court jurisprudence." In 1942 in Valen-
tine v. Christensen,45 the Court held that a state could prohibit the
distribution of a handbill containing both commercial and noncom-
mercial speech."6 The Court reasoned that when the primary pur-
pose of a handbill is commercial, the first amendment does not
prevent the state from regulating the advertisement. 7 The Court,
however, has retreated from this position in recent years and has
held that the first amendment now protects certain kinds of com-
mercial speech." For example, in 1975 the Court ruled that the
first amendment protects commercial speech that conveys informa-
tion, as opposed to commercial speech that merely promotes an
activity.4
In Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro50 the Su-
preme Court struck down an ordinance banning real estate sale
signs.5 The purpose of the ordinance was to curtail panic selling
and white flight that arose from fears that incoming minorities
were causing property values to deteriorate. The Court unani-
mously found that while the governmental purpose of promoting
stable, racially integrated housing was important, the ordinance
was not necessary to achieve the town's objective.2 Applying strict
scrutiny, the Court held that the town had not provided evidence
44. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-15, at 652, 655. For a discussion of the new doc-
trine, see Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REv. 372
(1979); Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720
(1982).
45. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
46. Id. at 55.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (newspaper editor may pub-
lish abortion advertisement); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112 (1943) (the first
amendment protects commercial speech that is incidental to religious speech); cf. Pittsburgh
Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 388 (1973) (hinting that
the first amendment protects commercial speech that does not advocate illegal activity). But
cf. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977) (overbreadth doctrine does not extend to
commercial speech).
49. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1975)
(invalidating statute that prohibits prescription drug advertisements, despite the state's in-
terest in regulating professional conduct); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S.
447, 455-56 (1978) (discussing the low priority of commercial speech in the scale of first
amendment values).
50. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
51. Id. at 95-96.
52. Id. at 95. The Court adopted this approach in Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766.
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establishing the necessary link between a ban on for-sale signs and
panic selling. 53 Thus, under Linmark the first amendment does not
permit a state to prohibit content-based commercial speech54 even
when the state's purpose coincides with a strong national commit-
ment" and plausible assumptions support the means that the state
chose to effect its purpose.56
In 1980 in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission57 the Court developed an intermediate level of
review5s consisting of a four-part test to determine what protec-
tion, if any, the first amendment accords commercial speech in a
particular case.59 First, to receive first amendment protection, com-
mercial speech must not be misleading or concern illegal activity.60
Second, if the commercial speech meets the first prong of the test,
the state may regulate the speech if the state has a substantial in-
terest in the speech.6 1 Third, the regulation must directly promote
the state interest.62 The last prong of the Central Hudson test re-
53. Even though the Court acknowledged that the town had a strong interest in pro-
moting integrated housing, the Court concluded that the town had failed to establish that
the ordinance was necessary to promote this interest. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 94-95. The re-
quirement of demonstrating necessity is typical in strict scrutiny cases. See Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (classification can stand only if it is "necessary to promote a
compelling state interest"); accord G. GUNTHER, supra note 13, at 389. The Court did con-
cede that the evidence permitted the "plausible" assumption that the for-sale signs caused
panic selling. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 96 n.10.
In addition, the Linmark Court implied that absent an emergency, the Constitution
prohibits resricting the free flow of truthful information: "It is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available, that the First Amendment makes for us." Id. at 97 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy
Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1975)).
54. The Court rejected the argument that the ordinance was only a time, place, and
manner restriction and questioned whether the town had alternative channels of communi-
cation. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 93. The Court also pointed out that the motivation of the
restriction was not "unrelated to the suppression of free expression." Id. at 93-94 (quoting
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)).
55. Linmark, 431 U.S. at 95.
56. Id. at 96 n.10.
57. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
58. See id. at 563. The Court stated that commercial speech deserves less protection
than other forms of speech under the first amendment. If the regulation entirely suppresses
commercial speech to pursue a nonspeech related policy, however, the Court will review the
policy with "special care." Id. at 566 n.9.
59. Id. at 566.
60. Id. at 563.
61. For examples of substantial state interests, see Linmark Assocs. v. Township of
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977) (racial integration in housing); Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 509 (1976) (administrative convenience); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164, 170, 173 (1972) (efficient distribution of property and protecting the family unit).
62. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. Under the third prong of Central Hudson the
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quires that the regulation must be no more extensive than neces-
sary to promote the state interest."3
The Court has applied the Central Hudson test inconsistently.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp." the Court used the test
protectively. The Bolger Court first determined that the pamphlets
in question were commercial, even though they had some informa-
tional content.6 The Court then held that a federal statute prohib-
iting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements about contracep-
tives66 provided only limited support for the mail recipient's
interest.6 7 The Court struck down the statute because its only pur-
pose was to exercise control over the mailbox.6 8 The Court rea-
soned that the regulation was more extensive than necessary be-
cause it merely served the parental purpose of determining
whether mail is worth reading or not. 9
In Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego 70 the Court applied mini-
mum rational basis scrutiny to the third prong of the Central
Hudson test.71 A San Diego ordinance permitted on-site commer-
cial advertisements, but prohibited most off-site commercial adver-
tisements and any kind of noncommercial advertisements.72 The
Court considered whether the city's regulation passed constitu-
tional muster under the Central Hudson test.73 In holding that the
regulation was constitutional, the Court characterized the nearly
total off-site prohibition as a reasonable means of promoting the
city's interest in safety and aesthetics. The Court, however, did
state must demonstrate a direct link between the means that the state employs to regulate
an activity and the end that the state is seeking.
63. Id.
64. 463 U.S. 60, 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983).
65. Id. at 2879-81.
66. The statute provides that "[a]ny unsolicited advertisement of matter which is
designed, adapted, or intended for preventing conception is nonmailable matter, shall not be
carried or delivered by mail, and shall be disposed of as the Postal Service directs ...... 39
U.S.C. § 3001(e)(2) (1982).
67. Bolger, 103 S. Ct. at 2884.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
71. Id. at 509; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
72. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 503.
73. Id. at 507-12.
74. Id. at 508-09. The Court justified the requirement of a merely reasonable basis by
quoting from Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949). In Railway Ex-
press the Court gave highly deferential treatment to economic regulations that a party chal-
lenged under the equal protection clause. This approach may be out of date. See G. GUN-
THER, supra note 13, at 688-704 (discussing the modem approach to equal protection
challenges to economic regulations). Professor Gunther points out that the Burger Court has
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not require empirical support for its means-ends analysis. 75
Whether the Court misapplied the third prong of the Central
Hudson test, or attempted to amend it, is not clear.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Three recent cases highlight the tension between the twenty-
first amendment and the first amendment when a state regulates
liquor advertisements. 6 Unlike LaRue and Bellanca, the statutes
in question directly regulate speech and indirectly regulate alco-
hol.71 In each case, the court applied the Central Hudson test and
then rejected the petitioner's first amendment claim.
A. Queensgate
In Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commis-
sion 7 8 the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a first amendment chal-
lenge to a liquor advertising regulation that the state legislature
promulgated pursuant to its power under the twenty-first amend-
ment. Applying the Central Hudson test, the court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a regulation that prohibited bottle or drink price
advertisements visible from the exterior of any premise with cer-
tain categories of liquor permits.7 9 First, the court found that the
advertisement in question was protected commercial speech under
given mixed signals regarding the appropriate level of scrutiny in economic regulation cases.
In the early 1970s, the Court employed heightened scrutiny and sometimes required the
government to provide an empirical justification for its economic regulations. Id. But see
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (highly deferential review).
75. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 508. The Court only stated that the city's solution was
obviously no broader than necessary. Id. Historically, the Court has interpreted the Central
Hudson test to require more than a rational relation between the state's goal and the
method it chooses to accomplish that goal. See cases cited infra note 131.
76. In addition to the three state regulations that this Recent Development discusses,
three other states have restricted alcohol advertising significantly. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 561.42(10)-(12) (West Supp. 1983) (allows only one alcohol advertising sign per product in
a liquor store window); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 24 (West 1974) (allows the Alco-
holic Beverages Control Commission to regulate liquor advertising); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-
7-26 to -28 (1953 & Supp. 1983) (allows each establishment only a single storefront sign).
77. See supra text accompanying notes 33 & 40.
78. 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982).
79. Id. at 365, 433 N.E.2d at 141. The regulation provided, in pertinent part:
No alcoholic beverages shall be advertised in Ohio except in the manner set forth
in 4301:1-1-03 and as hereinafter provided.
(A) As to advertising on the premises, holders of Class C, D, and G permits shall
not advertise the price per bottle or drink of any alcoholic beverage, or in any manner
refer to price or price advantage except within their premises and in a manner not
visible from the outside of said premises.
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-44 (1981).
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the first amendment because the regulation did not concern unlaw-
ful activity or misleading information."0 Second, relying on the
twenty-first amendment, the court recognized the state's substan-
tial interest in regulating alcohol.8
In assessing the state's compliance with the direct relationship
or third prong of the Central Hudson test, the court asserted that
the regulation concerned alcohol, not speech.8 2 This assumption
permitted the court to conclude, without analysis, that the state
had complied with this prong of the test because the regulation
directly advanced the government's interest in discouraging exces-
sive drinking.83 In finding that the regulation was no more exten-
sive than necessary to further the state interest under the fourth
prong of Central Hudson, the court asserted that advertising drink
prices encourages excessive drinking.84 Any other regulation, the
court stated, would be more extensive than a prohibition of alcohol
price advertising. 85 In applying the test, however, the court did not
require the state to produce any empirical evidence to support the
assumptions. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the pe-
titioner's appeal for lack of a substantial federal question, which is
technically an affirmance on the merits.86
B. Crisp
In Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp87 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that a regula-
80. Queensgate, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 365-66, 433 N.E.2d at 141.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 366, 433 N.E.2d at 142. The court reasoned that the regulation discouraged
sales, not just competition. Id. The court, however, never explained how the restriction of
advertising, which might affect sales, directly regulated intoxicants.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. When the Supreme Court summarily dismisses or affirms an appeal from a lower
court for lack of a substantial federal question, the decision is on the merits. Hicks v. Mi-
randa, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). The precedential value of the decision, however, is limited to the
precise issues that the lower court addressed. See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977)
(per curiam). The Supreme Court has stated that a summary disposition upholds only the
judgment of the lower court. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). In Confederated Bands the Court held that a summary
disposition "does not ... necessarily reflect [the ruling court's] agreement with the opinion
of the court whose judgment is appealed." Id. at 477 n.20.
87. 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.), rev'd on other ground sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984) (reversed due to federal preemption). The Supreme Court
specifically declined to address the first amendment issue. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2709
n.16.
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tion prohibiting most alcoholic beverage advertisements did not vi-
olate the first amendment under the Central Hudson test.8 8 The
plaintiffs, telecasters and cable operators, 89 challenged a regulation
banning virtually all alcohol advertising originating in state9" and
requiring broadcast media to block out alcohol advertisements
originating outside the state.91 The statute, however, did permit
beer and liquor advertisements that appeared in out-of-state
printed media.9 2
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by noting that the
twenty-first amendment gives an added presumption of validity to
state regulation of alcohol.9 3 The court, however, indicated that de-
spite the state's police power to regulate alcohol under the twenty-
first amendment,94 the state may not violate individual rights that
the fourteenth amendment guarantees.9 5 The court then performed
a Central Hudson analysis, concentrating on the third and fourth
88. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 502.
89. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 492. In the context of broadcast media the Court has held that
the federal government has additional police power. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726 (1978) (rejecting a first amendment challenge to an FCC regulation banning the broad-
cast of offensive words despite the absence of obscenity).
90. The plaintiffs challenged OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 516 (West Supp. 1982). The
Oklahoma Constitution provides the foundation for this regulation: "It shall be unlawful for
any person, firm or corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage within the state of
Oklahoma, except one sign at the retail outlet bearing the words 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor
Store.'" OKLA. CONsT. art. XXVII, § 5.
91. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 492. The Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion indicat-
ing that the state's alcohol advertising prohibitions apply to cable television as well as
broadcast television. This policy reversed the state's prior practice of permitting cable oper-
ators to relay wine advertisements that originated in foreign states. Id. Although neither
side raised this preemption issue in district or circuit court, the Supreme Court specifically
asked -the respondents to address the issue on appeal. Capital Cities, 104 S. Ct. at 2699
(1984).
92. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 502. The court addressed the precedential value of Queensgate
before turning to the constitutionality of the Oklahoma regulation. After noting that a sum-
mary dismissal by the Supreme Court is a decision on the merits, id. at 495, the court deter-
mined that case law, nevertheless, requires a court to confine its summary holdings to their
precise issues, id. at 496. The court referred to the Supreme Court's warning that the lower
courts should not preoccupy themselves with the precedential weight of summary disposi-
tions and neglect "to undertake an independent examination of the merits." Id. at 497
(quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177 (1977) (per curiam)). The court, therefore,
concluded that it must adjudicate the issues in the case. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 497; see also
supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 498 (quoting New York Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714,
718 (1981) (per curiam), which in turn quotes California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972)).
94. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 498. The court reasoned that the states should regulate alcohol
to protect citizens against its dangers. Id.
95. Id.
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prongs of the test.9 6 While the third prong requires that the regula-
tion in question directly advance the state's interest, the court as-
serted that this prong does not require that the regulation advance
the state's interest by the best means, but only by a direct means. 7
Relying on Metromedia and the twenty-first amendment, the
Crisp court used only a rational basis standard98 to examine the
direct link requirement of the Central Hudson test.99 The court
then held, as a matter of law, that the prohibition against alcoholic
beverage advertisements related reasonably to the proper regula-
tion of the beverages. 100 Like the Supreme Court in Metromedia,"'0
the Crisp court did not require empirical evidence to uphold the
regulation.102
Turning to the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, the
court again relied on Metromedia and the twenty-first amendment
to find that the regulation was no more extensive than necessary to
advance the state's interest.0 3 While the court conceded that the
regulation was a burden to the plaintiffs, the court appeared to feel
that the regulation was not unreasonable because it did allow for
beer and liquor advertisements that appeared in out-of-state
printed media. 04 The court concluded that the regulation was the
least restrictive means of promoting the state's interest.'05
The Supreme Court reversed Crisp on a federal preemption
96. The court quickly disposed of the first two prongs of the Central Hudson test. Id.
at 500. First, the court rejected the argument that because some of the advertisements por-
trayed public drinking, which is unlawful in Oklahoma, the advertisements failed under the
unlawful activity strand of the first prong of the test. Id. at 500 n.8. The court also rejected
the argument that the advertisements failed under the misleading activity strand of the first
prong because the advertisements associated drinking with good living. Id. at 500 n.9. Sec-
ond, the court determined that the state's police power to protect the health and oafety of
its citizens and its power under the twenty-first amendment easily complied with the second
prong of the test, which requires that the state have a substantial interest in the activity. Id.
at 500.
97. Id. at 500.
98. Id. at 500-01. Notwithstanding an earlier promise to the contrary, id. at 499, the
court implied that the twenty-first amendment strengthens the case for requiring only a
reasonable basis standard.
99. Id. at 501.
100. Id. The court concluded that the twenty-first amendment precludes judicial in-
quiry into the directness of the means-ends link.
101. 453 U.S. 490, 509 (1981).
102. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 501. Although the court acknowledged that the record did not
demonstrate a direct link between the regulation and alcohol consumption, the court still
held that the ban was reasonable as a matter of law. Id.
103. Id. at 501-02
104. Id.
105. Id. at 502.
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ground without considering the Tenth Circuit's first amendment
analysis.106 The Court, however, did suggest that it would give less
deference to the states under the twenty-first amendment when
they did not directly seek to regulate alcohol.10 7 The Court noted
that the core of the states' twenty-first amendment power is to reg-
ulate directly the sale and use of alcohol.108 When a state regula-
tion only indirectly implicates the core twenty-first amendment
power, the state's interest is weaker. 10 9 In Crisp the regulation was
indirect because it had only a limited effect on the consumption of
alcohol and did not apply to all alcohol advertisements.10 The reg-
ulation's direct effect was on the alcohol advertisements that it
prohibited. The Court, therefore, concluded that the federal inter-
est in regulating cable television was more important than the
state's indirect promotion of its core twenty-first amendment
interest."'
C. Dunagin
In Dunagin v. City of Oxford1 2 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en
banc, upheld a Mississippi ban on alcoholic beverage advertise-
ments originating within the state against a first amendment chal-
lenge. Unlike the regulation in Crisp, the Mississippi regulation" 3
did not prohibit alcohol advertisements originating in a foreign
state.1 4 After noting that the Supreme Court might not extend
106. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984).
107. Id. at 2709.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984). For a discussion
of the district court decision, see Note, Mississippi's Prohibition, supra note 26, at 130-40.
113. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 740 n.3. The court did follow Crisp in recognizing that
Queensgate only has limited precedential value. Id. at 745-46. The court acknowledged that
Queensgate cautions against striking down the Mississippi regulation, but does not relieve
the court from undertaking its own examination of the case. Id. at 746.
114. The regulation in question provides in pertinent part:
No person, firm or corporation shall originate advertisement in this State, dealing with
alcoholic beverages by any means whatsoever, including but not limited to newspapers,
radio, television, circular, dodger, word of mouth, signs, billboards, displays or any
other advertising media, except as follows:
(1) On the front of any licensed retail package store building, and no higher than
the top of the roof of the permitted place of business at its highest point, there may be
printed without illumination, in letters not more than eight (8) inches high, the name
of the business, the permit number thereof, which may be preceded by the words
"A.B.C. Permit No. _," and the words "Package Liquor Sold Here." Where the
package retail store is located in a building of more than one story in height, the top of
[Vol. 37:14211436
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first amendment protection to the advertising of products that the
states may prohibit, the Fifth Circuit, nonetheless, applied the
Central Hudson test.115 Once the court decided that the commer-
cial advertising was neither unlawful nor misleading under Central
Hudson's first prong, the court examined state power under the
twenty-first amendment to determine whether the state had a sub-
stantial interest in regulating liquor advertising."' The majority
noted that LaRue and Bellanca sustained regulations restricting
fully protected speech when the Court relied on state power under
the twenty-first amendment." 7 Relying on these precedents, the
Dunagin court concluded that the state had a substantial interest
in regulating alcohol.""
After a lengthy analysis the court also found that the chal-
lenged regulation directly advanced the state interest by the least
restrictive means."" The court followed Crisp and Metromedia in
sustaining the regulation because it had a reasonable connection to
the state interest. 12 0 The majority also claimed to follow the Cen-
tral Hudson approach by asserting that the advertisers in Dunagin
aimed at expanding the alcohol market, not just at expanding their
market share.' 2 ' This assumption permitted the court to conclude
that because the advertisers aimed to increase the amount of alco-
such sign shall not be higher than the top of the first story.
Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-85 (1982), Regulation No. 6, reprinted in Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 740
n.3.
115. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 749-50. The court stated:
It probably makes no difference, however, whether this category of advertising is
treated as outside of commercial speech protection or whether the Central Hudson Gas
four-part test, discussed below, is applied, because cases of this category likely present
state interests which justify advertising restrictions that pass the latter test as a matter
of law.
Id. at 742.
116. Id. at 743-45.
117. Id. 745.
118. Id. The court's analytical procedure was unclear. After the court applied the first
prong of the Central Hudson test, id. at 747, the court discussed state power under the
twenty-first amendment, id. at 747-50. Courts typically examine state power under the
twenty-first amendment as part of their state interest discussion under Central Hudson's
second prong. See, e.g., Crisp, 699 F.2d at 500. When the Dunagin court actually addressed
the substantial state interest prong of the test, however, the court concluded, with little
analysis, that the state had a substantial state interest in regulating alcohol. Dunagin, 718
F.2d at 747. Thus, the court may have wanted to incorporate by reference the long discus-
sion of state power under the twenty-first amendment into its brief discussion of state inter-
est under Central Hudson.
119. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 747-51.
120. Id. at 747, 750.
121. Id. at 749.
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hol that consumers purchased, the advertisers threatened the state
interest in limiting alcohol sales.122 Because the court employed
only rational basis review, it did not require empirical findings to
support this conclusion.123 The court buttressed its approach with
the observation that it "simply [did] not believe that the liquor
industry [spent] a billion dollars a year on advertising solely to ac-
quire an added market share at the expense of competitors. '124
The court determined that the regulation 125 was no more ex-
tensive than necessary to promote the state interest under the
fourth prong of Central Hudson.126 Relying on Central Hudson
and Metromedia, the court concluded that the state may prohibit
alcohol advertising that endangers the public interest.127
122. The majority rejected the dissent's contention that Central Hudson was distin-
guishable because it pertained to a monopoly whose advertising necessarily aimed at an
increased market rather than an increased market share. Id. at 749. The dissent reasoned
that a monopoly, by definition, has the full market. Id. The majority pointed out that in
Central Hudson the electric utilities competed with other industries for a share of the mar-
ket. Id. (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569).
123. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
124. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 750.
125. The court disagreed with the plaintiffs' argument that out-of-state liquor adver-
tising, which the regulation permits, undercuts the effectiveness of the state regulations.
The court gave three reasons for dismissing the plaintiffs' argument. First, the court as-
serted that the plaintiffs' vigorous litigation of the case suggested that they believed that
additional advertising could increase their market share. The court inferred that liquor ad-
vertisements had not saturated the market if additional advertisements still could induce
the public to buy more alcohol. Id. Second, the court pointed out that the number of liquor
advertisements would increase dramatically without the regulation. The court reasoned that
the plaintiffs would not have tried the case if they did not want to advertise. Id. at 750-51.
Last, the court stated that in the event that liquor advertisements already had saturated the
market, the regulation did not threaten commercial speech interests because the public
could get the information from permitted advertisements. Id. at 751.
126. Id. at 751.
127. Id. After the court applied the Central Hudson test, the court addressed the
plaintiffs' equal protection argument. Id. at 752-53. The court rejected the contention that
the regulation violated a fundamental interest. Id. at 752. The court noted that no funda-
mental interest exists when the state has not violated a first amendment right. Id. The court
also determined that the regulation did not violate the equal protection clause because the
regulation did not discriminate among classes of consumers in Mississippi. Id. at 752-53.
The court, therefore, concluded that rational basis scrutiny was appropriate, and held that
the regulation passed muster under that standard. Id. at 753.
Judge Williams concurred in the result and agreed with the majority's application of
the Central Hudson test. Judge Williams, however, disagreed with the majority's implica-
tion that state power under the twenty-first amendment permits states to infringe on indi-
vidual liberties. Id. at 753-54 (Williams, J., concurring).
Judge Gee, writing for the five dissenting judges, referred to the vacated panel opinion,
in which the court found the Mississippi regulatory scheme an unconstitutional restriction
of commercial speech. Id. at 755 (Gee, J., dissenting). In that opinion the panel invalidated
the regulation on the ground that it did not directly advance the state interest. Lamar Out-
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IV. ANALYSIS
Queensgate, Crisp, and Dunagin are analytically defective for
three reasons. First, the courts did not properly apply the Central
Hudson test. Second, the courts relied too heavily on the preceden-
tial value of distinguishable cases. Last, the presence of state
power under the twenty-first amendment improperly influenced
the courts' first amendment analyses. This part of the Recent De-
velopment discusses each of these contentions in turn.
A. The Central Hudson Test Requires Intermediate Review
The Supreme Court developed the Central Hudson test be-
cause the Court felt that commercial speech merits first amend-
ment protection.12' The origin of first amendment protection of
commercial speech suggests that the Central Hudson test employs
an intermediate standard of review.'2 9 Justice Blackmun, in his
concurrence in Central Hudson, referred to the test as an interme-
diate level of protection.'30 Moreover, the language that the Court
uses in commercial speech cases is similar to the language that it
applies in other intermediate review cases. 13 1
door Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 701 F.2d 314, 331-33, vacated sub
nom. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983). The panel found that Central
Hudson requires intermediate scrutiny, id. at 332, which in turn requires a close fit between
legislative means and ends, as well as empirical evidence, id. at 332-33.
Judge Higginbotham joined the dissent in Dunagin and also wrote a separate dissenting
opinion. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 755 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Judge Higginbotham sug-
gested that the majority's distaste for intruding into legislative judgment was the "unidenti-
fied hand" that restrained the court from rigorously applying the commercial speech doc-
trine. Id.
128. See supra notes 44-75 and accompanying text (discussing first amendment pro-
tection of commercial speech).
129. The range of standards applicable to first amendment violations is a fertile source
of commentary. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-2; Emerson, supra note 31, at 439-40,
449-51, 470-81; Van Alstyne, supra note 31. For a discussion of the intermediate standard of
review, see supra note 23.
130. 447 U.S. at 573 (Blackmun, J., concurring); accord Case Comment, Standard of
Review for Regulations of Commercial Speech: Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 66
MINN. L. Rav. 903, 910 (1982). In addition, Justice Blackmun has stated that some commer-
cial speech infringements require strict scrutiny. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 577
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (strict scrutiny necessary when a regulation suppresses informa-
tion about a legally consumable product).
131. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (need
for "direct, substantial relationship" between means and ends in equal protection challenges
to gender based classifications); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (important objec-
tives must relate substantially to the state interest); Police Dep't v. Moseley, 408 U.S. 92, 95
(1972) (appropriate government interest); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (close
scrutiny requires that a law is reasonably necessary to legitimate state objectives); Stanley v.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The second prong of the Central Hudson test requires a sub-
stantial state interest to sustain an infringement on commercial
speech.13 2 The Court uses the words "substantial" and "important"
when it applies more than rational basis review, but less than strict
scrutiny.1 3 3 The third prong of the test requires that the challenged
regulation must directly promote the state interest.3 Under inter-
mediate review, the state must demonstrate a close, immediate, or
substantial relation between the regulation and the state inter-
est.13  Rational basis review, however, requires only a reasonable
relation,3 6 while strict scrutiny demands a necessary relation.37
The third prong, therefore, mandates intermediate review-more
than a rational relation, but less than a necessary one. In addition,
the Court usually does not demand empirical evidence under the
rational basis test. 38 Under intermediate review, however, the
Court has suggested 139 the need for empirical support to justify a
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (legitimate interests); Bennett, supra note 13, at 1054 n.34.
132. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564; supra text accompanying note 61.
133. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (equating substantial and im-
portant government interests).
134. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65; supra text accompanying note 62.
135. See Comment, Equal Protection and Due Process: Contrasting Methods of Re-
view Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 H~Av. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 541-45
(1979).
136. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 13, at 676-81; Bennett, supra note 13, at 676-81.
137. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). A necessary relation means
that no other viable method is available to promote the state interest. See Developments in
the Law, Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1101-03 (1969). For a discussion of ra-
tional basis review and strict scrutiny analysis, see supra note 13.
138. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory discrimi-
nation will not be set aside, if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.");
see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 16-3 (conceivable basis test). But see Bennett, supra note
13 (arguing that the rational basis test requires a closer connection between the regulatory
means and ends).
139. The Supreme Court never has stated expressly that intermediate review requires
a state to present empirical evidence to justify a regulation. Central Hudson, for example,
finds a direct link without empirical evidence. But if rational review demands only a reason-
able means to advance the state interest, then intermediate review should require more than
a reasonable or rational basis for the regulation.
Part of the problem lies in defining the word "reasonable." If reasonable means conceiv-
able, see L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 16-3, then rational review would require a logical absurd-
ity to invalidate a regulation. If the Court uses reasonable to mean plausible, see Bennett,
supra note 13, at 1057 (rational review requires a closer fit than conceivable); supra note 53
(Virginia Pharmacy Court invalidates regulation despite its premise relying on a "plausible"
assumption), seemingly, or apparently valid, likely, or acceptable, see AmERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY 1005 (1971), then the Court could sustain a regulation that follows from as-
sumptions which are more likely true than false. Although this definition still requires a
value judgment, it provides a starting point from which to measure the strictness of an
intermediate standard of review. Because intermediate review necessitates more careful
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regulation, which is another indication that the third prong of the
Central Hudson test mandates intermediate review.140
The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test requires that the
state regulate commercial speech no more extensively than neces-
sary to achieve the state goal.14' This formulation, analogous to the
least drastic means requirement of strict scrutiny,1 42 suggests that
Central Hudson mandates heightened review for two reasons.
First, because the rational basis test requires only that the regula-
tion be reasonable, whether a less extensive means of regulating
the activity is available is irrelevant. A least restrictive means
prong, therefore, does not make sense in a test requiring only ra-
tional review. Second, and more importantly, the least restrictive
means prong of Central Hudson strengthens the argument in favor
of requiring the state to provide empirical evidence to support a
challenged regulation. If the fourth prong is to have any content,
the state must demonstrate by evidence in the record that the reg-
ulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve the state's le-
gitimate interests. 43 Moreover, the presence of an element of strict
analysis than rational basis review, the constitutionality of a connection that the Court gives
intermediate review should require more than a plausible assumption to invalidate the regu-
lation. Absent a logically compelling inference, a state will have a hard time meeting this
standard without empirical evidence. See Gunther, Evolving Doctrine, supra note 13, at 21.
140. The Central Hudson Court invalidated the link between a state interest and the
regulation for lack of empirical support, while sustaining the link between a second state
interest and the same regulation, even though the second link also lacked empirical support.
The Court labeled highly speculative the link between the state's substantial interest in an
equitable and efficient rate structure for utilities and the state's advertising ban. Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569. The link relied on the assumption that promoting off-peak usage
also would increase peak usage, which might affect adversely the equity of the rate struc-
ture. The Court did not find that the link was irrational, but only too remote because it
lacked empirical evidence. Id. In the second case, the Court found a direct link between the
state interest in banning advertising and the regulation by asserting that the utility would
not protest the advertising ban unless the utility thought the ban affected sales. Id. Argua-
bly, this second link is less speculative because it assumes that the utility would not incur
the expense of litigation if the advertising ban did not threaten the utility's economic inter-
ests. In the second case the Court may have had a more persuasive basis on which to find a
causal connection. Cf. Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
769 (1975) ("[An] advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards one way or
the other. It affects them only through the reactions it is assumed people will have to the
free flow of drug price information.").
141. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570-72.
142. See Gunther, Evolving Doctrine, supra note 13, at 21. But see Emerson, supra
note 31, at 450-51 (suggesting that the Court did not contemplate that the O'Brien "no
greater than essential" test should be as rigorous as the "less drastic means" test).
143. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565-66; see also Linmark Assocs. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977); Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Mississippi State Tax
Comm'n, 701 F.2d 314, 332-33, vacated sub nom. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738
(5th Cir. 1983).
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scrutiny in the Central Hudson test suggests that courts should
apply the test rigorously by requiring empirical support for the di-
rectness prong as well.
In first amendment cases the Court examines the type of
speech a government regulation infringes on when determining
what protection the Constitution accords the speech.""' Courts ap-
ply strict scrutiny to any infringement 145 upon political or core
speech because the Supreme Court has held that political speech is
one of the most important first amendment values. 41 Commercial
speech, however, qualifies for a much more uncertain degree of
first amendment protection. Prior to the Court's acknowledgement
that commercial speech warrants protection under the first amend-
ment,147 the Court sustained reasonable regulations of commercial
speech. 4  To continue to apply rational review in commercial
speech cases would make the Court's subsequent grant of first
amendment protection to speech insignificant. The Court has
never developed a new test to apply to less than fully protected
speech and then used only rational review. 49
In Crisp'50 and Dunagin'5' the courts, relying on Me-
144. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-50 (1978) (dirty words in
context of FCC regulation); Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial
speech); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976) (sexually explicit but
nonobscene adult movies); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (obscenity
receives no first amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573
(1942) (fighting words do not receive first amendment protection). Some commentators feel
that the Court's approach is inappropriate. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 31, at 451-53; Van
Alstyne, supra note 31, at 107, 140.
145. For a discussion of the various levels of review that the Supreme Court may be
applying in first amendment cases, see Emerson, supra note 31, at 439-40, 449-51, 470-81.
Professor Emerson argues that expression should receive full first amendment protection,
while action should receive due process and equal protection safeguards. Id. at 477-78.
146. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see also Van Alstyne,
supra note 31, at 140; accord BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An In-
quiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978).
147. See supra text accompanying note 44.
148. See, e.g., Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); supra text accompanying
notes 45-47 (discussing Valentine).
149. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-2, at 580. Professor Tribe developed a two-track
analytical model to describe the way in which the Supreme Court analyzes first amendment
cases. Track one analysis presumes that a regulation is invalid whenever it directly infringes
on the communicative effect of an act. Id. at 582. Track two analysis imposes a balancing
test whenever the regulation has a direct effect on a noncommunicative act but incidentally
affects expressive conduct. Id. Tribe's approach is comparable to Justice Marshall's sliding-
scale approach in the equal protection area. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
150. 699 F.2d 490, 501 (10th Cir. 1983).
151. 718 F.2d 738, 750 (5th Cir. 1983).
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tromedia,152 improperly applied only rational review to the third
and fourth prongs of the Central Hudson test.' 53 In Dunagin, for
example, the court stated that either the "accumulated common-
sense" approach under Metromedia or judicial notice under Cen-
tral Hudson would satisfy the third prong. 54 The application of
either of these tests requires no more than a reasonable basis.
Under these lines of analysis, the Dunagin court reasoned that the
regulation injured the plaintiffs economically, or they would not
have challenged the regulation. Thus, the court inferred that the
regulation directly promotes the state interest in limiting the sale
of alcohol.
This reasoning, however, suffers from two flaws. First, the
plaintiffs in Crisp and Dunagin were advertisers, not liquor whole-
salers or retailers. The plaintiffs' principal concern was advertising
revenue, not alcohol revenue. The advertising ban, therefore, di-
rectly affected them. The states have a legitimate interest in regu-
lating alcohol consumption, not advertising. The direct connection
was between advertising revenue and the advertising ban. The
Crisp and Dunagin courts never identified the link between alco-
hol consumption and the advertising ban. Second, as the dissent in
Dunagin pointed out, Central Hudson concerned a monopoly, un-
like the businesses in the present cases. 55 A monopoly aims its ad-
vertising to increase demand, while a business in competition in
the market targets its advertising to increase its market share.'51 6
152. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100 & 120 (Crisp and Dunagin). In
Queensgate the standard was unclear but deferential.
154. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 750. Crisp also relied on Metromedia. See supra text ac-
companying notes 98-102. Under the judicial notice approach, the Dunagin court found a
direct link between the state interest in shielding its citizens from alcohol use and the ad-
vertising regulation, despite the existence of alcohol advertising that the regulation did not
prohibit. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs would not litigate the issue if alcohol adver-
tisements already saturated the market because further advertising would not increase over-
all alcohol consumption. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 750-51. This approach, however, ignores the
argument that the plaintiffs sought to increase their market share. Lamar, 701 F.2d at 331-
32.
The court's second line of analysis-that without the regulation advertising would in-
crease-does not address the underlying concern that the ban is permissible only if the
advertising threatens public health and safety. In addition, the court's assertion that the
regulation does not violate the first amendment if ample alcohol advertising exists disre-
gards the first amendment rights of the individual advertisers. The state may not infringe
upon commercial speech unless the infringement is necessary to further a state interest.
Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
155. See Lamar, 701 F.2d at 332 n.24.
156. Id. The Dunagin court emphasized the Supreme Court's acknowledgement in
Central Hudson that even a monopoly has competitors in alternative industries. Dunagin,
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Thus, the judicial notice approach in Central Hudson is less effec-
tive when the business is not a monopoly. 15 7 At a minimum, the
Queensgate, Crisp, and Dunagin courts should have required the
state to produce evidence indicating that increased advertising was
likely to cause increased alcohol consumption. 15
The courts also should have required that the state demon-
strate empirically that its regulations complied with Central Hud-
son's fourth prong. In Central Hudson the Court found that the
regulation was unconstitutional because the state failed to demon-
strate empirically that the regulation was no more extensive than
necessary.' 59 The Queensgate, Crisp, and Dunagin courts, however,
did not require empirical evidence when they analyzed the fourth
prong. For example, in Crisp the court merely asserted that the
regulation passed muster because the court could conceive of a
more drastic regulation. 6" Similarly, the Dunagin court found that
718 F.2d at 749-50 (quoting Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 567). The Supreme Court in Cen-
tral Hudson made this statement in the context of rejecting the argument that the first
amendment does not protect a monopolist's speech. The Court reasoned that because utility
customers could choose among alternative energy sources, they had a right to the informa-
tion in the advertisements to help them decide which energy source to use. Central Hudson,
447 U.S. at 567-68. The Court added that the informational content of a monopolist's adver-
tisements alone was sufficient to require first amendment protection. See id. Thus, the
Court made its comment that a utility may attempt to gain market share in a different
context than a discussion of the directness of the link between a state regulation and a state
interest. Moreover, the Central Hudson Court made this observation in conjunction with an
alternative rationale to provide first amendment protection to monopoly advertising. The
Dunagin court's out-of-context citation supporting its assumption that the Central Hudson
Court found that a monopoly may vie for market share is too tenuous to uphold an infringe-
ment of commercial speech. In the monopoly context, the market share rationale may be
less viable.
157. In a monopoly situation, arguably a court may infer that a direct link exists be-
tween a regulation and the state interest because the monopolist is more likely to try to
increase the overall demand for its product.
158. The Dunagin court contended that the issue of whether a direct correlation exists
between advertising and consumption is a legislative question and not a justiciable issue of
fact. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 748 n.8. This argument fails to address the need for courts to
evaluate the validity of legislative findings. When legislative findings are purely conclusory,
as in Dunagin, courts should scrutinize carefully the link between means and ends.
The Dunagin court cites Metromedia and Bellanca for the proposition that the states
need not provide empirical evidence. Metromedia and Bellanca, however, are distinguisha-
ble. See infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text. The court also cites Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983). Bolger struck down a law banning unsolicited
contraceptive advertisements because the purpose of the law was to exercise control over the
mailbox. Presumably, the state could have rebutted the plaintiff's arguments with legislative
findings. Id. at 2884.
159. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
160. See Crisp, 699 F.2d at 502. In addition, when the court applied the direct rela-
tionship prong, it indicated that the state only had to use a direct means to promote its
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no less restrictive means would be effective to further the state in-
terest, even though the court did not examine empirical evidence,
as Central Hudson requires. 161
The dissent in Dunagin distinguished the Metromedia ap-
proach on the ground that Metromedia concerned a content-neu-
tral restriction,16 2 which requires less rigid scrutiny than a content-
based restriction. 6 3 Queensgate, Crisp, and Dunagin are content-
based restriction cases because they single out alcoholic beverage
advertising.6 4 The Supreme Court has held that when the govern-
ment is concerned with the substance of a communication, rather
than its commercial nature, regulation of commercial speech is im-
permissible unless the speech is false or misleading. 65 Central
Hudson itself states that strict scrutiny is appropriate when a reg-
ulation bans commercial speech for a nonspeech related reason. 66
The Queensgate, Crisp, and Dunagin courts misapplied the
Central Hudson test by not using intermediate review. The third
and fourth prongs of the test require that the state produce empir-
ical evidence to prove that the regulation directly supports a sub-
stantial state interest by means no more extensive than neces-
sary.16 7 In addition, the presence of content-based restrictions
interest, not the best means. Id. at 500. This argument, however, ignores the fourth prong of
Central Hudson, which requires the state to advance its interests by the least restrictive
means.
161. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 751; accord Note, Liquor Advertising, supra note 26, at
183-85.
162. See Lamar, 701 F.2d at 332 n.25. The dissent pointed out that Metromedia dealt
with a form of advertising instead of a type of speech. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493-94.
In addition, Metromedia was a plurality decision and thus has limited precedential value.
See Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 756 (1980).
163. See, e.g., Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769-
71 (1976) (commercial speech context); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 12-2 to -3; Far-
ber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727
(1980) (arguing that content regulation should be permissible in certain cases); Redish, The
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (contending
that the Court should not distinguish between content-based and content-neutral
restrictions).
164. See supra notes 91-92 & 113 and accompanying text.
165. Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 91, 96 (1977).
166. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 n.9. Moreover, Central Hudson suggests that
strict scrutiny is appropriate in Crisp and Dunagin because they concern a near total ban
on speech for a nonspeech related reason. But cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968) (state may infringe upon speech that is predominately conduct if the purpose of the
infringement does not relate to the content of the speech and the state only incidentally
infringes upon the speech).
167. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65, 570-72.
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militates in favor of an even stricter application of Central
Hudson.
B. Misuse of Precedent
The Crisp and Dunagin courts' heavy reliance on California v.
LaRue"' and New York v. Bellanca 69 to sustain the states'
twenty-first amendment power to regulate commercial speech 17 0 is
improper because LaRue and Bellanca are not on point. First, in
LaRue and Bellanca the Court did not undertake a first amend-
ment analysis. Instead, the Court applied rational review, even
though the Court never has held that rational review is the appro-
priate standard in first amendment cases. The Court's implicit ex-
planation for its analytic approach in LaRue and Bellanca was
that the challenged regulations governed liquor licenses, not
speech.' 71 This distinction is inappropriate in the present cases be-
cause the challenged regulations directly address protected com-
mercial speech. Thus, LaRue and Bellanca have limited preceden-
tial value in cases concerning the direct regulation of commercial
speech.1
72
A second reason that the Crisp and Dunagin courts' heavy re-
liance on LaRue and Bellanca is inappropriate is that the Supreme
Court typically accords more deference to the partial regulation of
168. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
169. 452 U.S.714 (1981).
170. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 743-45, 748 n.8, 750; Crisp, 699 F.2d at 498. Crisp and
Dunagin also relied on Queensgate. Both courts insisted that controlling precedent required
them to undertake an inquiry independent of the precedential value of the summary dismis-
sal of the Queensgate appeal, but both courts still referred to Queensgate in their first
amendment analysis. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 750 ("Queensgate helps to establish the balance
in favor of the state, if balancing be necessary" (emphasis added)); Crisp, 699 F.2d at 502
(Queensgate mandates shift of balancing test in the state's favor permitting regulation of
commercial speech not otherwise subject to regulation under the twenty-first amendment).
The extent to which Queensgate changed the result in Crisp and Dunagin is unclear. The
Crisp and Dunagin courts both believed that the issue in Queensgate was close enough to
the issues that Crisp and Dunagin addressed to serve as controlling precedent. Dunagin,
718 F.2d at 746; Crisp, 699 F.2d at 497. Queensgate, however, concerned only a partial ban
on liquor advertising, while Crisp and Dunagin concerned almost total prohibition. See
supra notes 91 & 113-15 and accompanying text.
171. See Lamar, 701 F.2d 314, 327.
172. The Crisp and Dunagin courts' reliance on LaRue and Bellanca to justify ra-
tional review is troubling for another reason. The Supreme Court might have sustained the
regulations in LaRue and Bellanca even under strict scrutiny because the state has a com-
pelling interest in preventing the violence that often accompanies the mixing of drinking
and sexually provocative dancing. See infra note 179. Moreover, the LaRue and Bellanca
courts probably chose the least restrictive means to regulate the activity because the state
prohibited only the mixing of alcohol and suggestive dancing.
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expression 173 in LaRue and Bellanca 1 74 than it accords to the more
complete alcohol bans in Crisp and Dunagin.75 The regulations in
LaRue and Bellanca only prohibited certain kinds of dancing in
establishments with liquor licenses. 76 and did not eliminate alter-
native forums for lewd dancing. Under Crisp and Dunagin, how-
ever, only minor exceptions exist to the prohibition of alcohol ad-
vertising.1 7 Thus, the existence of alternative forums in LaRue
and Bellanca provided the Court with a rationale to sustain the
partial prohibition of alcohol. This rationale is not present in Crisp
and Dunagin.
Third, reliance on LaRue and Bellanca is improper because
they concerned more substantial state interests than Crisp and
Dunagin. In Crisp and Dunagin the states asserted that the state
legislature enacted the regulations prohibiting alcohol advertise-
ments to protect the health and safety of the public. Thus, the
state sought to indirectly discourage, but not prohibit, people from
drinking alcoholic beverages. 17  The LaRue and Bellanca courts,
however, did not face a problem of conflicting state policies. In La-
Rue and Bellanca the state sought to prohibit the potentially vola-
tile mixture of sexually provocative entertainment and alcohol,"79
173. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (upholding an
"Anti-Skid Row" ordinance that allowed adult movie theatres throughout the city except in
certain zoned locations).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 29 & 40.
175. See supra notes 89-91 & 112-14 and accompanying text.
176. Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 714; LaRue, 409 U.S. at 111-12.
177. See Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 738; Crisp, 699 F.2d at 492. For example, beer adver-
tisements are generally permissible, while regulations limit liquor advertisements to signs on
liquor-licensed premises. In addition, an exception exists in Mississippi for advertisements
that originate outside the state. See supra note 114.
178. See supra notes 90, 112 & 118 and accompanying text. Justice Blackmun stated
that he doubts "whether suppression of information concerning the availability and price of
a legally offered product is ever a permissible way for the state to 'dampen' demand for or
use of a product." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
179. See supra text accompanying notes 28 & 43. LaRue and Bellanca may have relied
implicitly on the established doctrine that states may prohibit speech when a clear and
present danger exists. The Court set forth this doctrine in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969) (per curiam). Brandenburg formulated two criteria that are necessary to take
otherwise protected speech out of the ambit of first amendment protection. The test re-
quires that the speech is (1) "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless acts"; and
is (2) "likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 447; see L. TRIBE, supra note 3, §§ 12-9
to -11.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the mixture of alcohol and sexually provocative
entertainment can be dangerous. See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 117-18. The record in LaRue re-
vealed evidence of prostitution, rape, assaults, and indecent exposure near the licensed
premises. LaRue, 409 U.S. at 111.
For a discussion of the clear and present danger standard, see Cohen v. California, 403
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but did not ban alcohol consumption or nude dancing once
separated.
The final reason that the Crisp and Dunagin courts' reliance
on LaRue and Bellanca is inappropriate is that obscene or offen-
sive speech or behavior, such as the dancing in LaRue and Bel-
lanca, receives a reduced level of first amendment protection.180
Even when obscene or offensive speech warrants first amendment
protection, the Court has struggled with the precise degree of cov-
erage to accord the speech because it is so far removed from fully
protected political or core speech. Commercial speech, on the other
hand, receives greater first amendment protection. 8 Thus, courts
scrutinize infringements of commercial speech more carefully than
they scrutinize infringements of nude dancing.
82
C. Undue Influence of the Twenty-First Amendment
The courts in Crisp and Dunagin improperly allowed the pres-
ence of state power under the twenty-first amendment to diminish
the first amendment protection of commercial speech. The courts'
principal analytical flaw was their use of the twenty-first amend-
ment'8 3 to emasculate the third and fourth prongs of the Central
U.S. 15 (1971) (offensive language printed on jacket); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951) (police could not prevent spectator violence if race-baiting speech continued); Termi-
niello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (race-baiting speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words).
180. See supra note 145.
181. See Van Alstyne, supra note 31, at 140.
182. Another feature that distinguishes LaRue and Bellanca from Crisp and Dunagin
is that the protected activity in LaRue and Bellanca was conduct, not pure speech. Bel-
lanca, 452 U.S. at 716-18; LaRue, 409 U.S. at 116-18. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968), the Court articulated a balancing test, an intermediate standard of review, for
regulations that concern speech and conduct. Under the O'Brien test, a regulation governing
activity containing speech and nonspeech elements is permissible if: (1) the regulation is
within the constitutional power of the government; (2) the regulation furthers a substantial
government interest; (3) the interest does not relate to the infringement of speech; and (4)
the regulation is no greater than necessary to further the government interest. Id. at 377.
Commentators have found this test less protective of the first amendment than strict scru-
tiny. See L. TRIBE, supra note 3, § 12-2, at 580, 685-86; see also G. GUNTHER, supra note 13,
at 1317-19; Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Rules of Categorization and Bal-
ancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1975).
The LaRue and Bellanca Courts may have believed that the expression of offensive
speech through lewd dancing deserved even less protection than O'Brien affords. See La-
Rue, 409 U.S. at 116 (state not limited by O'Brien test). The offensive conduct element in
LaRue and Bellanca may explain the Court's use of the deferential rational basis standard.
See id. at 117-18.
183. The courts, however, properly used the states' twenty-first amendment power to
find a substantial state interest.
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Hudson test.8 4 In Crisp the court held that, in light of state power
under the twenty-first amendment, the regulation directly pro-
moted the state interest as a matter of law.18 5 The Dunagin major-
ity was only slightly more tentative in a similar assertion. 186 The
inquiry into the directness of a regulation, however, is a question
of fact, not law. The Crisp and Dunagin courts also referred to a
presumption of validity in favor of alcohol regulations under the
state's twenty-first amendment power, 87 even though the Central
Hudson test does not incorporate a presumption in the state's
favor. Thus, even if a court finds that state power under the
twenty-first amendment gives the state a substantial interest
under the second prong of Central Hudson, a court cannot employ
the twenty-first amendment to uphold a regulation that does not
directly promote the state interest by the least restrictive means. s8
The Supreme Court expressly has rejected the theory that the
twenty-first amendment alters the appropriate constitutional stan-
184. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. The Queensgate court's approach
was more analytically sound. The court only used the twenty-first amendment to strengthen
the state interest in the Central Hudson test. Queensgate, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 365-66, 433
N.E.2d at 141-42. The court did not refer to the twenty-first amendment in applying the
third and fourth prongs of the test. Id. at 366-67, 433 N.E.2d at 142.
185. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 501. The court stated, "With particular emphasis on the...
Twenty-first Amendment, we hold that the advertising prohibitions here are no more exten-
sive than is necessary. . ... When the Twenty-first Amendment is [present] . . . . the bal-
ance shifts in the state's favor, permitting regulation of commercial speech that might not
otherwise be permissible." Id. at 502.
186. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 742. The court declared, "[I]t probably makes no difference
.. . whether the Central Hudson Gas four-part test. . .is applied, because cases of this
category likely present state interests which justify advertising restrictions that pass the
latter test as a matter of law." Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 745 (questioning whether a
balancing test is necessary when the court can rely on the twenty-first amendment).
187. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 745; Crisp, 699 F.2d at 501-02. In LaRue the Court men-
tioned a presumption of validity that the Court accords state power under the twenty-first
amendment. 409 U.S. at 118-19. This presumption, however, goes to the strength of state
power, not to the link between a state's regulations and its interests.
188. Arguably, even a compelling state interest could not sustain a regulation infring-
ing upon commercial speech if the regulation did not directly support the state's interest by
the least restrictive means. Supreme Court jurisprudence does not provide explicitly for rel-
ative adjustments in the application of the Central Hudson test. In the future, however, the
Court may require less empirical evidence for a given prong of the Central Hudson test
without eliminating entirely the requirement of empirical evidence. Thus, an unusually
strong state interest might require only a less direct link to the regulation, while an unusu-
ally close link might require a less substantial state interest. In both cases, however, the
interest still would be substantial and the link still would be direct. Moreover, to eliminate
the standards of the test because of the presence of the twenty-first amendment expressly
would violate Supreme Court precedent. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Wisconsin
v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text (discussing
Craig and Constantineau).
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dard of review in equal .protection cases. 189 The first amendment
merits similar respect. 9 '
The language that the Crisp and Dunagin courts employ sug-
gests that they permitted the twenty-first amendment to water
down their first amendment analysis.' 9 ' In Crisp the court said
that the twenty-first amendment permits the regulation of speech
that the states otherwise could not regulate. 95 Dunagin questioned
whether a first amendment analysis is necessary at all.
93
The Supreme Court's decision in Capital Cities 94 reinforces
the conclusion that the twenty-first amendment unduly influenced
the lower courts. The Court noted that when the states use the
twenty-first amendment only to limit indirectly the use and con-
sumption of alcohol, federal interests may invalidate the state reg-
ulation. 195 In Capital Cities the Court found that the federal inter-
est in regulating cable signals overrode the state interest in
indirectly regulating alcohol. 96 Individual interests that the first
amendment implicates certainly deserve as much respect as cable
signals.
V. AN ANALYTIc FRAMEWORK
A. Proposal
The Supreme Court should reaffirm the approach that it
adopted in Craig v. Boren'9 7 and apply an independent first
amendment analysis in state alcohol advertising cases. The Court
should not permit the twenty-first amendment to diminish consti-
tutionally protected individual rights. The Court should reverse
the trend that it established in LaRue and Bellanca of carving out
an exception to the Craig approach for violations of the first
189. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-05 (1976).
190. Accord Lamar, 701 F.2d at 329 n.20.
191. See Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 742-45; Crisp, 699 F.2d at 501-02.
192. Crisp, 699 F.2d at 502.
193. Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 743-45. Moreover, the concurrence in Dunagin referred to
the inappropriate discussion of the twenty-first amendment in the majority's first amend-
ment analysis as "mischievous and insidious." Id. at 753-54 (Williams, J., concurring). Judge
Williams agreed with the majority's application of the Central Hudson test, id., but he
feared the majority's implication that the twenty-first amendment can justify "unusual and
wholly unique intrusions upon the personal liberties of American citizens." Id. at 753.
194. 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984), reversing on other grounds sub nom. Oklahoma Telecast-
ers Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1984).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 106-11.
196. 104 S. Ct. at 2709.
197. 429 U.S. 190 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 19-24 (discussing Craig).
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amendment.198 The Court must apply the appropriate constitu-
tional standard and not water down its analysis because of the
twenty-first amendment. For example, if a standard requires a di-
rect means-ends link, the presence of the twenty-first amendment
should not reduce the requirement to a merely reasonable relation.
Second, the Court should recognize the sliding scale approach
to first amendment cases that is implicit in constitutional jurispru-
dence.199 In the first amendment context, courts consider political
speech as a core value and, therefore, afford it the greatest protec-
tion.2 00 The further the speech is from the core, the less first
amendment protection the speech receives, and the less substantial
the requisite state justification for regulating the speech.0 1 Under
this approach, a state could justify a content-neutral regulation
with a more indirect link than the state could justify a content-
based regulation.0 2
The sliding scale approach does not permit a court to alter the
standard of review that it chooses to apply. Once a court chooses
the appropriate standard, however, the sliding scale analysis does
permit the court to make adjustments to reflect the relative inter-
ests of the parties. Thus, the presence of the twenty-first amend-
ment arguably strengthens a state's interest, and a court justifiably
may decide to require less empirical evidence in support of the re-
lationship between the regulation and the state's goal. The state
still would have to demonstrate empirically the link between the
regulation and the state goal, but with less conclusiveness than a
weaker state interest would require. Similarly, a court could de-
mand more empirical support when the regulation concerns a con-
tent-based restriction rather than a content-neutral restriction.
Any balancing of interest would occur above the threshold of the
applicable standard of review. The sliding scale approach, there-
fore, does not permit a strong state interest to eliminate the re-
quirement of empirical evidence, but only to reduce the requisite
degree of empirical evidence that the state must put forth.
B. Application
Applying the proposed framework to Queensgate suggests that
a court could sustain the Ohio regulation with only minimal empir-
198. See supra notes 25-43 and accompanying text (discussing LaRue and Bellanca).
199. See supra note 145.
200. See authorities cited supra note 146.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 144-46.
202. See supra note 188.
1984] 1451
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:1421
ical findings to show that the regulation promotes Ohio's interests.
The alleged violation concerned commercial speech,03 which re-
ceives less than full first amendment protection. °4 Moreover, the
state limited its regulation of alcohol advertising,205 and the Court
views partial bans more favorably than full bans.2 06 Thus, the
state's strong interest under the twenty-first amendment might
justify this partial alcohol advertising ban.07 The Supreme Court,
nevertheless, should have remanded the case to require the state to
demonstrate empirical evidence supporting its regulation.20 8
In Crisp and Dunagin, on the other hand, the courts should
have struck down the state regulations on first amendment
grounds.2 09  The asserted state interest, promoting health and
safety by discouraging alcohol consumption, was substantial. The
state regulation, however, prohibited almost all alcoholic beverage
advertisements. Moreover, the content-based restriction required
heightened first amendment protection. The courts should have in-
validated the regulation because the state failed to establish em-
203. Queensgate, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 365, 433 N.E.2d at 141.
204. See supra notes 44-75 and accompanying text; see also Van Alstyne, supra note
31, at 140.
205. Queensgate, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 366, 433 N.E.2d at 141-42. The regulation does not
prohibit nonprice liquor and wine advertising in most forums of general information dissem-
ination by the holders of class C, D, and G permits. The regulation also does not prohibit
price advertising of original containers or packages of liquor or wine by the same license
holders, provided that the advertisements do not make reference to price advantage. Thus,
the affected permit holders have numerous forums in which to promote their products, un-
like in Crisp and Dunagin.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 173-75.
207. Queensgate keeps the twenty-first and first amendment analyses separate. In
Queensgate the Ohio Supreme Court claimed that the state aimed its regulation at intoxi-
cants and not speech because the state's purpose was to discourage alcohol consumption,
not competition among the sellers. Queensgate, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 366, 433 N.E.2d at 142; cf.
Bellanca, 452 U.S. at 717; LaRue, 409 U.S. at 114. Apparently, the court believed that the
asserted aim of the regulation reduced the stringency of the Central Hudson test. The court
implied that the regulation in Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1975), would require more of a direct link with the state interest than the regula-
tion in Queensgate. Queensgate, 69 Ohio St. 2d at 366, 433 N.E.2d at 142. The Queensgate,
regulation, nevertheless, directly affects speech by prohibiting price advertising per bottle
and drink in virtually all forums. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
The Queensgate court also adopted the judicial notice approach regarding the least re-
strictive means prong of the test. 69 Ohio St. 2d at 366, 433 N.E.2d at 142; cf. Bellanca, 452
U.S. 714 (1981); LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
208. Ironically, because Ohio has chosen to regulate advertising in a limited manner,
the state may have difficulty proving even the diminished empirical demonstration that the
proposal requires. The state must show that its limited price advertising proscriptions pro-
mote its interest in discouraging excessive alcohol consumption.
209. Remand in these cases is probably unnecessary because the states had ample op-
portunity to make the empirical demonstrations that this Recent Development advocates.
1452
ALCOHOL ADVERTISING
pirically a direct relationship between the state's means and
ends,210 or that the regulation was the least restrictive means avail-
able to accomplish the state's purpose.
VI. CONCLUSION
The twenty-first amendment provides states with broad power
to regulate alcohol. This power, however, does not permit the
states to infringe upon constitutional rights. The twenty-first
amendment should not affect the determination of whether the
state may infringe upon a constitutional right. Queensgate, Crisp,
and Dunagin wrestled with difficult questions regarding the consti-
tutionality of regulating alcohol advertisements. The courts, how-
ever, gave too much weight to the twenty-first amendment. The
courts' faulty reasoning, if allowed to stand, could influence other
courts and endanger constitutional guarantees of individual rights
in the guise of state power under the twenty-first amendment.
Brian S. Steffey
210. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
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